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1 Introduction
The traditional Downsian model of politics assumes that parties can credibly commit to
keep their policy promises once they reach o¢ ce. The availability of this commitment
technology allows them to manipulate policy proposals so as to garner the fraction
of votes that maximizes their probability of winning. Political competition thus leads
to convergence of proposed policies to the median voters ideal point. A number of
renements of this model have been proposed in the literature since Downss 1957
contribution, many of which have attempted to reverse the problematic hypothesis of
complete convergence in policy proposals implied by Downsian competition1. Until the
late nineties, most of this literature generally took as given the underlying assumption
of a perfect capacity of politicians to make credible commitments2. Besley and Coate
(1997) and Osborne and Slivinsky (1996), however, showed that some of the key results
of the Downsian model fall apart when the assumption of perfect credibility is relaxed.
In particular, electoral competition need no longer lead towards full or even partial
convergence in policy platforms once parties lose their ability to make credible promises.
Indeed, a multiplicity of equilibria become feasible, some of which entail very extreme
policies being proposed in equilibrium.
Testing for the existence of credibility problems in politics is a di¢ cult task, partly
because of the problems that the multiplicity of equilibria creates. In principle, if we
had information on politiciansplatforms and ideal points, we could compare these
with the policies that are actually adopted upon reaching o¢ ce in order to evaluate
whether politicians live up to their promises.
Because of di¢ culties in measuring politicianspreferences and distinguishing them
from their platforms, empirical work on testing for the existence of credibility problems
has instead focused on testing other implications of credibility models. Roughly speak-
ing, two di¤erent lines of research exist: one is to test the credibility model against
a model of pure Downsian competition which predicts complete convergence in plat-
forms, while a second one is to test the credibilty model against a model of imperfect
Downsian competition that predicts partial convergence in platforms. An example
of the rst line of research is Chattopadhyay and Duos (2004) study of the e¤ect
of political reservations of Village Council head positions to females in India. In a
pure Downsian world, policies do not depend on the identity of candidates and thus
should not vary with political reservations. Chattopadhyay and Duo nd evidence of
signicant changes in spending priorties when political reservations are adopted, thus
1Useful surveys include Mueller (2003), Hinich and Munger(1997), and Roemer (2005).
2A notable exception is Alesina (1988), who studies the credibility problem within the framework
of a repeated game in which reputational equilibria can play the role of commitment technologies.
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providing evidence that is inconsistent with the pure Downsian model but consistent
with the existence of credibility problems or a model of partial Downsian convergence.
Lee, Moretti and Butler (2004) provide an example of the second line of research.
They note that in models of partial convergence observed policies should move closer
to politicians ideal points in reaction to an exogenous shock in their probability of
winning. The authors nd no evidence of such an e¤ect in the voting records of
members elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, a result that contradicts the
partial convergence model and is consistent with the existence of credibility problems.
Both of these papers use quasi-natural experiments (randomized assignment of political
reservations in India, results of close elections in the U.S. House) to address possible
endogeneity problems.
Our paper complements existing research by proposing an alternative simple way
of discriminating between models that assume commitment and those that preclude it.
The test is based on the following observation: the key distinction between politicians
who can credibly commit to keep their promises and those who cannot is that the
former can control the expectations of the policies that they will enact once they reach
o¢ ce. Suppose then that we can pinpoint a case in which policy positions appear to
be set in a manner that is clearly inconsistent with optimizing behavior, in the sense
that if parties were to change them they could increase their expected utility. Then
we would have reason to doubt that parties have much control over these positions.
A simple example of a policy position that is inconsistent with optimizing behavior
is a position that is so extreme that it ensures its party defeat at the polls. Adopting
such a position brings no gains to the party, as it leads enacted policies to move away
from his ideal point. If we see parties systematically adopting such positions, this may
be symptomatic of their inability to credibly commit to a di¤erent position.
Examples of candidates whose positions were too extreme for their own good
abound. Take the example of George McGoverns 1972 candidacy in the US pres-
idential elections against Richard Nixon. Most political analysts believed there was a
reasonable chance that Nixon would have been defeated in the 1972 election had he run
against a more moderate candidate. Nixon won the 1972 election with a remarkable
landslide, carrying more than 60% of the popular vote and losing only Massachusetts
and the District of Columbia. The generalized perception was that George McGov-
erns candidacy, which proposed a 37% reduction in defense spending in the midst of
the Cold War, was too radical to woo a majority of American voters (White, 1972,
p. 123). By adopting such a radical platform, the democrats ensured Nixons victory
and the continuation of conservative policies.
McGoverns example is not isolated. Barry Goldwaters 1964 promise to make so-
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cial security voluntary and Walter Mondales 1984 commitment to raise taxes are often
seen as examples of misguided political choices that cost them the presidency. So was
Mario Vargas Llosas promise to carry out a shock-therapy stabilization programme in
the 1990 Peruvian presidential election against Alberto Fujimori, or Carlos Menems
2003 promise to dollarize the Argentine economy in his failed bid to recover the pres-
idency after the collapse of the Argentine convertibility plan. Our examples beg the
question of why these politicians did not choose to moderate their policy proposals.
A conventional analysis of these examples would characterize them as gross miscalcu-
lations, based on mistaken beliefs about what votersactual preferences really were.
Under the alternative interpretation that we espouse, there is nothing irrational about
these policy platforms. It wasnt George McGoverns policy platform that cost him
the presidency: it was his preferences. Had he proposed a more moderate platform,
voters would not have bought it.
In the next section we show that it is possible to empirically identify cases in which
the policies that voters expect parties to carry out are too extreme to be the result
of optimizing behavior in the presence of a commitment technology. We suggest to
do this by studying the shape of the expected policy function, which maps politicians
platforms into expected policies. Optimizing parties that can make credible commit-
ments will never situate themselves on a segment of that function in which further
moderation would lead expected policies to be closer to their ideal points. Doing so
would leave unexploited the possibility of increasing the expected payo¤ for the par-
ties by driving policies closer to their optimum while lowering uncertainty at the same
time. Although the expected policy function cannot be directly used in the presence
of credibility problems, we show that the indirect expected policy function, which maps
preferences of party constituents into observed policies, shares the same comparative
statics implications of the expected policy function and can thus be used to test for
the existence of credibility problems.
Another way in which our research complements the existing literature is that we
face squarely, at the empirical stage, the potential inference problems that multiplicity
of equilibria of the underlying political economy model of interest may have. Using the
comparative statics hypothesis of a single equilibrium case when there exist multiple
equilibria is a form of model misspecication that can easily lead to erroneous infer-
ences. In this paper we adapt ideas from Echenique and Komunjer (2005), based on
the estimation of conditional quantiles, to test comparative statics implications about
the extremes of a set of equilibria. We show that the extreme equilibria of a commit-
ment model with multiple equilibria inherit the comparative statics implications of a
simple equilibrium model, allowing us to empirically evaluate the models implications
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by studying the behavior of extreme equilibria at di¤erent quantiles. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the rst empirical paper in the eld of political economy to
implement a test that fully accounts for the e¤ects that the existence of multiple equi-
libria in the data generating process may have on the observed relationships between
exogenous and endogenous variables in the data. As such, the way in which we conduct
our empirical work has the potential of being useful also in other economic situations
where multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic theory,
introducing the direct and indirect expected policy functions and deriving the key
comparative statics implications that emerge form it. Section 3 contains our empirical
analysis, which uses data on abortion preferences and legislation for a panel of 50
states and the District of Columbia. We show that a substantial fraction of our
estimates display a negative relationship between the policy preferences of Democrat
and Republican constituents and enacted policies, in contrast to what one would expect
if a commitment technology was present. Section 5 concludes with some comments
on directions for further research.
1.1 Heuristic Exposition
We start out from a simple graphical presentation of our main idea. Denote a partys
policy platform as i 2 R+ , where i = l; r denotes each of the two parties in a two-
party environment. Let Pl(l; r) denote the probability that party l wins the election
given the policy that voters expect it to carry out if elected (l) and that which they
expect his opponent to carry out if elected (r). Dene the expected policy function,
e(l; r); as the expectation of the policy to be enacted given policy platforms:
e(l; r) := E() = Pl(l; r)l + (1  Pl(l; r))r (1)
Figure 1 plots an example of an expected policy function, for a xed value of r.
Generally, the expected policy function will have increasing and decreasing segments
as drawn. Now suppose that l were a credible party with an ideal policy tl lower than
that of the right-wing party (tr). Since a credible party can convince voters that it
will implement any policy that it promises to pursue, then it can move its proposal
at will to any point on e(l; r). Suppose now that in equilibrium it is proposing a
policy platform Al which is on a decreasing segment of the expected policy function.
It would then be better for l to slightly moderate its strategy, say to Bl . At the new
strategy, the expected policy will be e(Bl ; r), which is lower (and thus closer to his
5
ideal point) than e(Al ; r). It will also face a less risky lottery than it was facing
before between the outcome in which it wins the election and Bl gets implemented
and that in which it loses and r gets implemented, since Bl is closer to r than 
A
l
was. It thus follows that Al is not an optimal policy for a risk-averse credible left-wing
party.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Matters are di¤erent for a party that faces a credibility problem. Such a party
cannot a¤ect expected policies by moderating its platform because voters are convinced
that it will always carry out his optimal policy tl if elected. Thus, it does not have
the capacity to move along the expected policy function. In e¤ect, voters will always
expect non-credible politicians to carrry out their prefered policy (i = ti), so that
they are in e¤ect stuck at whatever segment on the expected policy function their ideal
point falls on. It follows that it is perfectly feasible for non-credible politicians to be
on the decreasing segment of the expected policy function. This contrast between the
empirical implications of the models gives rise to our empirical strategy: to estimate
the expected policy function and to identify whether parties tend to be located on the
increasing or decreasing portions of this function.
As stated, estimating the expected policy function is unlikely to be feasible, as it
requires us to observe i , the policies that voters expect politicians to carry out in
equilibrium. However, as we will show below it is straightforward to establish that the
equilibrium policies i (tl; tr) for the parties are increasing in the partiesideal policies.
From this it follows that we can derive an indirect expected policy function as:
e(tl; tr) := 
e(l (tl; tr); 

r(tl; tr)) (2)
with the property that when politicians can make credible commitments e will be
strictly increasing in both of its arguments.
Our result follows from the fact that whenever a party decides to adopt a more
moderate policy position, it is trading o¤ two e¤ects of moderation. On the one
hand, adopting a more moderate stance may move expected policies away from its
ideal point. This will occur if the change in policies when it is elected outweighs the
lower probability of losing the election. On the other hand, moderating its position
will certainly imply decreasing the distance between the enacted policy if it wins and
the enacted policy if it loses, and thus entails undertaking a safer bet. In equilibrium,
parties will trade o¤ these two e¤ects until they nd a policy proposal where the
marginal loss from further moderation is exactly o¤set by the marginal gain in terms
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of reduced risk. It follows that credible parties will always situate themselves in a
position in which further moderations would lead to movements in the expected policy
away from their ideal points. Politicians whose ideal point is below that of their
opponents will be in a range where increases in their policy proposals lead to increases
in the expected policies; those that are above the ideal point of their opponents will be
in a situation where decreases in their policy proposals lead to decreases in expected
policies. Therefore the expected policy function must be positively sloped.
This does not happen if parties lack credibility, because in this case they cannot
a¤ect their probability of winning by moderating. Voters know that they will carry out
their preferred policies and will pay no attention to any policy commitments that parties
attempt to make. Therefore, it is perfectly possible for a party that lacks credibility to
be situated in the downward-sloping segment of the expected policy function. It would
be great for that party if he were able to moderate his policy proposals: it would lead
expected policies to come closer to his own preferred policy and would also reduce the
risk coming from the uncertainty over the policies enacted by di¤erent parties. But
the party with a credibility problem may well be stuck in this range of the expected
policy function because it has no capacity to a¤ect the expected policy function: for
voters its relevant platform comes not from what he says, but from what they know
that it will do.
Our empirical work will concentrate on estimation of the slope of (2). In Section 4,
we will use the preferences of the median Republican and Democrat constituent as our
indicators of ti. Note that in order for this to be a consistent strategy all that we need
is that the preferences of the median party member and that of the partys nominee
be positively related. This result is generally true regardless of whether parties face a
credibility problem vis-a-vis their constituents.3
2 Theoretical Framework
The policy space is the interval T = [0; 1] : All individuals have preferences described
by a strictly concave utility function V (t; ) ; where t 2 (0; 1) is the unique maximum
of V in T (the ideal policy point for the individual) and  is the adopted policy. V
satises the property that V (t; ) = V (t+ d;  + d) for t; ; t+d; +d 2 T . There are
3It is trivially true if within-party competition is Downsian. For the case of credibilty problems, see
Proposition 7 of Besley and Coate, which ensures that in a two-candidate equilibrium, the candidates
ideal points will be symmetrically distributed around the median, so that the expected ideal point of
the elected candidate is equal to that of the median voter. An interesting possibility however, is that
even in the presence of credibity problems parties may use the nomination process as a commitment
device, nominating candidates who are more moderate than the median party member. In this case,
the predictions of the commitment model would apply.
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two parties, l and r; with ideal points tl < tr: We assume that if a party is indi¤erent
between several policies given the policy adopted by its opponent then it will pick the
policy that gives the party its highest chances of winning4. This and the the concavity
of V in T has the implication that each partys best response correspondence 'i will
be single-valued.
Votersideal points are distributed over the policy space T . In general, the distri-
bution G of voters is unknown to the parties. The parties propose policies l and
r. Let g (l; r) be the proportion of voters who prefer l over r according to the
true distribution of voters G. Each party forms beliefs about G and, given the pro-
posed policies, they estimate the probability of each party winning the election, that
is Pl (l; r) = Prob
 
g (l; r) >
1
2

and Pr = 1  Pl. Because of this uncertainty, the
policy preferred by the median voter is uncertain.
In what follows the parties may or may not have access to a commitment technology.
We rst study two versions of the model with commitment: One with specic functional
forms for the utility function and the beliefs of the parties and a more general version of
the model, consistent with a large variety of preferences and beliefs for the parties. Next
we illustrate what happens if parties cannot commit to a particular policy platform.
2.1 Example of a model with commitment
In this model party l with ideal point tl sets its policy l to solve
max
l
Pl (l; r)V (tl; l) + (1  Pl (l; r))V (tl; r)
taking r as given. Party r with ideal point tr sets r to solve
max
r
Pr (l; r)V (tr; r) + (1  Pr (l; r))V (tr; l)
taking l as given.
In this sub-section we consider the case where Vi(a) =  (ti )2 and assume, as in
Roemer (2001, p. 69) that the parties are polarized in their interests in that tl < 12 < tr.
We also follow Roemer (2001, p. 45) by modeling the proportion g (l; r) of voters
who prefer l over r as given by
l+r
2
+ ; where  is a random variable uniformly
distributed on the interval [ ; ] ; for some small positive . The interpretation is
that, given the policy proposals adopted by the parties, parties are condent of the
proportion of voters who prefer l over r only up to a margin of error. From this
4We assume further that if the party cannot a¤ect its chances of winning then the party adopts
its preferred policy as its platform.
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it follows that in this model the probability that l defeats r when they respectively
promise l and r is:
Pl(l; r)jl<r =
8><>:
0 if l+r
2
+  < 1
2
1
2
+ l+r 1
4
if l+r
2
2 1
2
  ; 1
2
+ 

1 if l+r
2
   > 1
2
; (3)
Pl(l; r)jl=r =
1
2
; and
Pl(l; r)jl>r = 1  Pl(r; l)jr<l
Let (l ; 

r) be the Nash equilibrium of this game with commitment. Our main
goal in this sub-section is to show that in this simple model the policies adopted in
equilibrium, and hence the expected policies, are increasing in the partiespreferred
policies.
Given the structure adopted above it is not hard to show the following:
Lemma 1 In equilibrium 0 < P (l ; 

r) < 1 and tl  l < r  tr:
The proof follows from the fact that any policy proposal that a party can modify
such that this modication would simulteaneously increase its chances of being elected
while at same time getting the party closer to its ideal point cannot be an equilibrium.
For a formal proof of this and all the other results in this Section please see the
Online Appendix.5
The next step is to show that, at the Nash equilibrium, the reaction functions of
the parties are upward sloping.
Lemma 2 @'l(r;tl)
@r

r=r
> 0; @'r(l;tr)
@l

l=

l
> 0
The intuition behind this result is based on the fact that there are two e¤ects of
the increase in r on party ls decision:
(i) It makes it more painful for party l to lose, which will make party l want to
moderate its policy further to atenuate the probability of this ocurring. We call this
the policy e¤ect.
(ii) It increases party ls probability of winning. This e¤ect may drive party l
platform towards its preferred policy. We call this the probability e¤ect.
The lemma follows in this case because, for the specied utilities and beliefs chosen
in this subsection, the overall e¤ect always has the same sign as the policy e¤ect.
5http://ssrn.com/abstract=1390704
9
As the preferred policy of party l increases, this will have as an e¤ect to make the
partys platform to increase as well, given party rs proposal. In other words, party ls
reaction function "shifts to the right" as its preferred policy point moves to the right.
Similarly for party r (party rs reaction function "shifts up"). See Figure 2(a).
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Lemma 3 @'l(

r ;tl)
@tl
> 0;
@'r(l ;tr)
@tr
> 0
The intuition is that as the leftist party suddenly becomes more conservative the
cost from moderating its platform lessens, hence the party will moderate its policy
more than before the change in preferences, to increase its probability of being elected.
2.1.1 Equilibrium Comparative Statics
Combining these lemmas yields the main result from this sub-section, which is illus-
trated in Figure 2(b):
Theorem 4 @

l (tl;tr)
@tl
> 0;
@l (tl;tr)
@tr
> 0; similarly for party r.
Our main comparative statics result, the one we will bring to the data, pertains the
(indirect) expected policy function, dened as
e(tl; tr) := 
e(l (tl; tr); 

r(tl; tr))
Corollary 5 @
e(tl;tr)
@tl
> 0; @
e(tl;tr)
@tr
> 0
In words: for parties that can commit to a particular policy platform, as the pre-
ferred policies of the parties become more conservative, the policies that can be ex-
pected in equilibrium also become more conservative.
The intuition behind this last result was discussed at length above, in sub-section
1.1.
2.2 The general model with commitment
One could wonder if the results obtained in the previous sub-section are an artifact of
the specic utility function specied for the parties or of the particular way in which
uncertainty about the distribution of voters is viewed by the parties. Below we show
that the results hold in a vastly more general model than the one studied in the previous
sub-section.
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As in the previous sub-section, in this model party l with ideal point tl sets its
policy l to solve
max
l
Pl (l; r)V (tl; l) + (1  Pl (l; r))V (tl; r)
taking r as given. Party r with ideal point tr sets r to solve
max
r
Pr (l; r)V (tr; r) + (1  Pr (l; r))V (tr; l)
taking l as given. The di¤erence here is that we do not pick a particular functional
form for V or P .
We do make, however, the following non-parametric assumptions about the distri-
butions Pl and Pr.
A0 (Symmetry) Pl (l; r) = Pr (r; l)
This says, in essence, that voters care about the policy that is adopted, and not
about the identity of the party that implements it.
A1 (Uncertainty) l = r ) For some party i 2 fl; rg 90i such that j0i   tij <
ji   tij and Pi (0i;  i) > 0:
This says, in essence, that the problem of determining who will win this election is
non-trivial, that is, there can be some uncertainty over the winner if the parties do not
adopt the same policies.
A2 (Monotonicity) l  0l < r ) Pl (l; r)  Pl (0l; r) and
r < l  0l ) Pl (l; r)  Pl (0l; r) ; similarly for Pr.
This says, in essence, that moving your proposal towards the policy of your oppo-
nent does not lower your chances of being elected. On the other hand, moving it away
from that of your opponent may decrease them.
2.2.1 Properties of the Nash equilibria of the game
Lemma 6 Assume A0 holds. Then Pl ('l (r) ; r) 2 (0; 1] : Similarly for party r.
Because party l will never pick a policy that would guarantee a zero probability of
victory in what follows we restrict the strategy space for party l, given r, to the set
of policies l for party l such that Pl (l; r) 2 (0; 1] : Similarly for party r.
Lemma 7 Assume A0-A2 hold. Then in equilibrium tl  l < r  tr:
Notice that under A0-A2 from the argument espoused above the best response for
party l to r  tr satises 'l (r)  r and that there is no equilibrium with r > tr:
11
Consequently, in what follows we restrict the strategy space for party l, given r, to
the set of policies l for party l such that Pl (l; r) 2 (0; 1) and l  r: Similarly for
party r.
Consider now the expected policy function,
e (l; r) := Pl (l; r)l + (1  Pl (l; r))r:
Lemma 8 Assume A0-A2 hold. Fix r > tl and let l = 'l (r) : Pick 0l > l: Then
e (0l; r)  e (l; r) : Similarly for party r.
2.2.2 The Nash equilibria of the game
The following denition will be needed in what follows. The percent change in party
ls probability of winning when going from l from 0l; given r; is given by
%Pl (l; 
0
l; r) =
Pl (
0
l; r)
Pl (l; r)
  1:
We make the following assumption regarding the behavior of %Pl:
A3 (log supermodularity) %Pl (l; 0l; 
0
r)  %Pl (l; 0l; r) for l  0l and
r  0r:
This says that the percent change in the probability of winning that follows a certain
increase in party ls policy is no smaller when party rs policy is high than when party
rs policy is low.
Lemma 9 Assume that A0-A3 hold. Then if 0r > r, then we have that 'l (
0
r) 
'l (r) :Similarly with the roles of the parties reversed.
The interpretation is that the best response function for party l is non-decreasing
in the policy of party r. Similarly for the best response function for party r. This is
illustrated in Figure 2(c).
From the monotonicity of the best response function for both players and Tarskis
theorem (c.f. Vives, 2001, p. 20) it follows that the set E of Nash equilibria is non-
empty and it has a greatest and a least element (l; r) and (l; r) in the sense that
if  2 E then     : This will be very important in what follows.
2.2.3 Equilibrium Comparative Statics
It turns out that under the assumptions espoused above the (expected) payo¤ function
for party l satises a single crossing property in (l; tl) ; and similarly for party r.
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Important comparative statics implications derive from this fact. Let EV (tl; l) denote
the expected payo¤ function for party l for a xed policy r for party r.
Lemma 10 Assume that A0-A2 hold. Then if 0l > l and t
0
l > tl then we have that
EV (tl; 
0
l)  EV (tl; l)) EV (t0l; 0l) > EV (t0l; l) ;
and similarly for party r.
Theorem 11 Assume that A0-A3 hold. Then the largest and smallest Nash equilibria
of the game,  and , are increasing in tl and tr:
Figure 2(d) illustrates this result: the smallest equilibria of the model parametrized
by (tl; tr) is smaller than the smallest equilibria of the model parametrized by (t0l; t
0
r) ;
when (t0l; t
0
r) > (tl; tr) : Similarly for the largest equilibria of the models. Figure 2(d)
makes it clear that comparison of the rest of the equilibria may not even be meaningful,
since the model parametrized by (tl; tr) has an "intermediate" equilibrium but the
model parametrized by (t0l; t
0
r) does not.
In equilibrium, the indirect expected policy function can be computed as follows:
e (tl; tr) = 
e (l (tl; tr) ; r (tl; tr))
Let 
e
(tl; tr) and e (tl; tr)be the indirect expected policy corresponding to the largest
and smallest equilibrium respectively, and let E be the set of all policies that can arise
in all of the equilibria of the model. In what follows members of E are called the
equilibrium predictions of the model.
We know from Lemma 8 that the expected policy is increasing in l and l for
rational politicians. From Theorem 11 we know that the largest and smallest Nash
equilibria of the game,  and , are increasing in tl and tr: It thus follows that the
indirect expected policy function associated with the largest and smallest equilibria are
also increasing in tl and tr: This, together with Lemma 8 yields the following:
Corollary 12 If t0l  tl then 
e
(t0l; tr)  
e
(tl; tr) and e (t0l; tr)  e (tl; tr) : Simi-
larly for t0r  tr:
2.3 A model without commitment
When politicians cannot precommit to adopt a particular policy voters expect that, if
elected, a party will adopt its most preferred policy. Therefore, the politicians cannot
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a¤ect the probabilities of being elected and in the unique equilibrium, l = tl and
r = tr: Because of this, the adopted policies are trivially increasing in tl and tr:
It turns out, however, that in the model without commitment Lemma 8 fails and
hence the indirect expected policy function need not be increasing in the ideal points
of the politicians, as in the model with commitment. We illustrate that this is the case
with an example.
Consider the following partial specication of beliefs:
Pl (r; r) =
(
l
a
for l  a
1 for a < l < r
; where
r
2
< a < r
Hence, the indirect expected policy function in this case satises
e (tl; tr) =
(
tl
a
tl +
 
1  tl
a

tr for tl  a
tl for a < tl < tr
; (4)
which is a decreasing function of tl when evaluating the function at any tl < tr2 : Hence,
if the ideal point for party l happens to be to the left of tr
2
; the indirect expected policy
function will be decreasing in tl at that point.
In our empirical work we use the fact that the indirect expected policy function in
the model with commitment responds di¤erently to changes in tl and tr as the one in
the model without commitment to identify how important the credibility problem is
in practice.
3 Statistical Framework
When economic models of a situation of interest have multiple equilibria the stan-
dard practice is to impose additional assumptions so that the models yield a unique
prediction. These additional assumptions are often very strong, and independent of
the desired economic explanation. Moreover, they may be wrong, and this may pose
a problem in the context of conducting proper inference on whether the comparative
statics results developed above are consistent with observed data.
Traditional econometric analysis is based on the estimation of the conditional ex-
pected values of the variables of interest. If the polity underlying the situation under
study, however, has multiple equilibria, the study of conditional expectations may yield
the wrong inference.
To illustrate this consider a situation like the one depicted in Figure 3, which is
an extension of the example depicted in Figure 2 (d). The situation is one in which
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there are two congurations for t: lowand high.The polity dened by the low t
has three equilibria whereas the one dened by the higher t has two equilibria. These
equilibria come from a model like the one developed in sub-section 2.2 so that the
extreme equilibria are monotonically increasing in t as implied by Theorem 11.
In this setting, the data that may be observed by an econometrician, conditional
on t, may come from di¤erent equilibria that are observed imprecisely (as represented
by the densities and the "arrows" depicted in Figure 3). Moreover, because nothing
precludes for the proportion of data points that come from the di¤erent equilibria to
vary with t, it can be that the estimated expected value of the endogenous variables
conditional on t may not pick up the monotonicity that is present in the structure of
the polity, as shown in Figure 3(a). On the other hand, when we estimate su¢ ciently
extreme conditional quantiles we are putting more weight on the data points that
are more likely to be consistently coming from the extreme equilibria, and thus we
are much more likely to capture any monotonicity relationship that may be present
between parameters and the endogenous variables in the polity, as exemplied in Figure
3(b).
[Insert Figure 3 here]
In light of the above, we conduct our empirical work "twice:" once under the as-
sumption that the "true" model of the polity under study has only one Nash equilib-
rium, and then a second time under the assumption that multiple equilibria cannot
be ruled out. The actual estimation of conditional quantiles (by means of quantile
regressions) for the purpose of testing comparative static results arising from a model
with multiple equilibria is a separate contribution of this paper as these ideas, to our
knowledge, have never been applied to any data set.
3.1 When the model has a unique equilibrium
The econometrics behind the unique equilibrium case are standard. In this case our
empirical work is concentrated on attempting to estimate the indirect expected pol-
icy function presented in (2). As we have shown, the credibility and commitment
models have di¤erent implications for the slope of this function: under presence of
a commitment technology, it is always positively sloped, whereas in their absence it
can display a negative slope. In the next Section we evaluate these predictions using
data on preferences over abortion and abortion legislation decisions in a panel of U.S.
states. Expressions l (tl; tr) and 

l (tl; tr) dene the equilibrium policies as a function
of tl, and tr. Both of these equations dene E() , whereas what we observe is the
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realization of :
i = E(i ) + i = f(tl; tr) + i . (5)
where i refers to the e¤ect on policies of the the realization of the uncertainty regard-
ing p(li ; ri ) in state i and year  . Note that the uncertainty captured in (5) is in
essence an uncertainty regarding the true location of the median voter. As the pref-
erences of the median voter in the state will in general not be orthogonal to the ideal
points of the parties, it will be important to control for this term. Thus we decompose
i into the part of it that depends on the preferences of the median voter and those
that reect the uncertainty arising from the impreciseness of the model:
i = mi + "i
Adopting a linear form gives us our estimating equation:
i = 0 + 1tri + 2tli + mi + "i : (6)
Equation (6) thus allows us to nest the predictions from the commitment and
the credibility models. In the model with commitment, 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. In
the credibility model, no denitive prediction is made about the sign of 1 and 2.
Nevertheless, we have shown that 1 < 0 and 2 < 0 are distinct possibilities in such a
model. It follows that if our estimates of 1 and 2 are positive, we will be unable to
distinguish between the two models, but if they are negative, it will be strong evidence
against the commitment model. Parameter , in contrast, is premised to be positive in
both models: given l and r, an increase in mi leads to an increase in the probability
that the highest proposed policy wins.
Our key tests will be focused on estimating an equation like (6). However, such
an equation may not provide a very strong test against alternative theories of politics
according to which other characteristics of the distribution of preferences a¤ect policy
outcomes. To take an example, theories of interest groups (Grossman and Helpman,
2002) tend to emphasize that some individuals (those who belong to better-organized
groups) have a greater capacity to a¤ect policies than others. In order to provide an
empirical test that is strong against such type of competing hypotheses, we augment
the regression in (6) as
i = 0 + 1

ri + 2

li + 31i + :::+ 2+kki + mdi + "i : (7)
where 1i :::ki are alternative characteristics of the distribution of voter prefer-
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ences, such as its conditional or unconditional moments. Equation (7) embodies the
idea that any theory of politics is in e¤ect a theory of the relationship between the
distribution of policy preferences and policy outcomes.
3.2 When the model has multiple equilibria
Echenique and Komunjer (2005) show how comparative statics results like the ones
we obtain in this paper translate into restrictions on the conditional quantiles of the
endogenous variables. Under some regularity conditions, if the largest and the smallest
equilibria are increasing in the exogenous variables, then a su¢ ciently high and a
su¢ ciently low conditional quantile of the endogenous variables will also be increasing
in the exogenous variables. Their framework makes no assumptions on the cardinality,
location or probabilities over equilibria. In particular, they do not assume any kind
of equilibrium selection rule. We can therefore potentially test whether a particular
data set is consistent with the model with commitment by testing this monotonicity
relationship between the ideal points of the parties and a su¢ ciently high conditional
quantile of the policies that we can expect will be adopted in equilibrium.
To make this operational we estimate quantile regressions (Koenker, 2005), that
is, we model the quantiles of the conditional distribution of the adopted policies as
functions of the policy preferences of the politicians and other observed covariates, and
examine the signs of the coe¢ cients of those quantile regressions on the ideal points
of the politicians. If the model with commitment is adequate for our data then we
should expect those coe¢ cients to be positive, for su¢ ciently high and su¢ ciently low
conditional quantiles of the adopted policies.
The model without commitment, on the other hand, does not exhibit any mul-
tiplicity, and one can test whether the policies that we can expect will be adopted
in equilibrium are increasing or decreasing in the parameters of interest by means of
conventional least squares regressions.
3.2.1 Multiple Equilibria Econometric Setup
In what follows we consider the parameter set T 3 tl; tr to be a nite set and dene
T = T  T  R2: We suitably adapt Echenique and Komunjer (2005) to our setting
and dene a reduced form model as a collection ((Et; qt) ; t 2 T ) such that:
(1) for all t, Et  R++ is nite and non-empty;
(2) t < t0 implies that min Et < min Et0 and max Et < max Et0 ;
(3) for all t, pt is a probability distribution over Et such that pt (min Et) > 0 and
pt (max Et) > 0:
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Interpret this in light of the model developed in the previous section: T contains
all possible ideal points for both parties, Et is the set of policies that may end up being
implemented in equilibrium when the ideal points of the politicians are given by t 2 T .
The set  = [t2T Et is the set of all possible values of the policy variable as t varies in
T . The elements of  are denoted : Let t = max Et and t = min Et:
In Echenique and Komunjer (2005), the probability distribuition pt represents the
unknown equilibrium selection process and so they range over the possible (determin-
istic) equilibria that can take place, conditional on t. Our setting di¤ers from theirs in
that here the econometrician does not observe the equilibria, but rather the policy that
is adopted by the party that ends up winning the election. Therefore, in this paper the
probability distribution pt is a mixture that arises out of combining some unspecied
equilibrium-selection procedure with the probabilities that particular policies have of
being adopted in equilibrium. Hence, if Et is the set of equilibrium policy proles
when the ideal points of the politicians are given by t 2 T and pEt is a probability
distribution over Et such that pEt (minEt) > 0 and pEt (maxEt) > 0; we then have
that
pt () =
X
2Et

1fl=gPl (l; r) + 1fr=gPr (l; r)

pEt () :
With this modications in place we can then apply the machinery of Echenique and
Komunjer (2005) without further changes to derive conditions that allow the compari-
son of conditional quantiles for di¤erent values of t to be a valid test of the comparative
static results derived in Section 2.
The next step is to dene our statistical reduced form model as 
(Et; pt) ; (H;t)2Et ; t 2 T

such that
(1) ((Et; pt) ; t 2 T ) is a reduced-form model,
(2) for all t 2 T and  2 Et; H;t is a twice-di¤erentiable distribution function on
R++; with strictly positive density.
The model is to be interpreted as follows: Think of the realized policies in the data
as coming from a multiplicative model
    ";
where  2 Et is an equilibrium prediction, drawn according to pt; and " is a multiplica-
tive random error,drawn from distribution H;t: According to this  is a random
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variable with distribution Ft given by a discrete mixture of continuous distributions.
Ft (y) =
X
2Et
pt ()H;t
y


for any y > 0:
Given  2 (0; 1) ;let q ( jt) denote the  quantile of  conditional on t;
q ( jt)  inf fy 2 R++ : Ft (y) > g
and dene H;t by H;t  1 H;t:
Say that H;t is in R 1 at 1 if for  > 0
lim
y!1
H;t (y)
H;t (y)
=  1
Distributions in R 1 at1 are not very heavy tailed, meaning that their tails decrease
to zero faster than any power law y :
Consider the following assumption on the structure of the tails H;t :
S2. Say that a statistical reduced-form model
 
(Et; pt) ; (H;t)2Et ; t 2 T

satises
S2 if
(1) for every t 2 T , H;t is in R 1 at 1;
(2) for every  2  with  < t; H;t(y)Ht;t(y) is bounded as y goes to 1; and
(3) for every (t; t0) 2 T 2 with t < t0; Ht;t(y)
Ht;t0 (y)
is bounded as y goes to 1:
Under this assumption one can establish an unambiguous connection between the
parameters of interest and the conditional quantiles of  under Ft:
Theorem 13 (Echenique and Komunjer, 2005) If
 
(Et; pt) ; (H;t)2Et ; t 2 T

sat-
ises S2 then for any (t; t0) 2 T 2 :
(i) there is  2 (0; 1) such that t < t0 implies q ( jt) < q ( jt0) for all  2 [; 1) :
The interpretation is that if the distribution H;t is not too heavy tailed the e¤ect
of t on the largest equilibrium in Et will eventually be noticed in the tail of Ft.
This result, properly transposed, holds for  su¢ ciently close to zero.
3.2.2 Quantile regressions
The argument just espoused essentially shows that, under some regularity condi-
tions, su¢ ciently high and su¢ ciently low conditional quantiles of the adopted poli-
cies will be increasing in the ideal points of the parties. To estimate those condi-
tional quantiles we now follow the general approach of Koenker (2005) and we t
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quantile regressions corresponding to the quantiles f0:1; 0:25; 0:75; 0:9g to the data
f(1; 2; : : : ; N) ; (t1; t2; : : : ; tN) ; (x1; x2; : : : ; xN)g ; where N is the sample size, i is
the realized policy for observation i, ti is the prole of ideal points of the parties for
observation i and xi is a d dimensional vector of controls for observation i. According
to this methodology, one estimates the conditional quantile regression by minimizing
a sum of asymmetrically weighted absolute residuals. Hence, if we wish to under-
stand how the conditional quantiles depend on t, we can model them as functionsbq ( jt; x; ) ;which can be found as the solution to
min
2Rd+2
NX
i=1
 (i   bq ( jt; x; )) ;
where
 (u) =
(
u if u  0
(1  )u if u < 0 :
We elaborate on the econometric issues regarding the edtimation of such quantile re-
gressions for our panel of 50 states in sub-section 4.3.
4 Estimation
4.1 The Data
Our paper will test the above derived hypotheses on a panel covering data on abortion
legislation and preferences for the 50 United States. Although the model can in
principle be applied to the study of the determination of any policy, we concentrate on
abortion for several reasons. In the rst place, the extensive interest on the abortion
issue in the United States has led to the detailed documentation of voter preferences
over time through opinion surveys like the General Social Survey (GSS) and National
Election Studies (NES). Furthermore, the public opinion literature has found that
abortion preferences are somewhat less susceptible to framing e¤ects than many other
public policies. Even though, as is generally the case in public opinion studies, the
answers given to survey questions tend to be sensitive to changes in question wording,
studies have found that respondents can accurately place themselves on abortion using
a variety of question formats, and that the operationalization of attitudes towards
abortion generally seems robust across di¤erent measurement strategies (Cook, et. al.
1993, Jelen and Wilcox, 2003). A last point has to do with the availability of signicant
variation across states and time in the adoption of legislative restrictions to abortion.
Both the NES and GSS have been measuring attitudes towards abortion since the
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1980s. The NES studies have posed the following question in every survey since 1980:
I am going to read you a short list of opinions. Please tell me which one of the
opinions best agrees with your view. (1) By law, abortion should never be permitted,
(2) The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the womans
life is in danger, (3) The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape,
incest, or danger to the womans life, but only after the need for the abortion has been
clearly established. (4) By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion.
The GSSs question is the following:
Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman
to obtain an abortion... (1) if there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby?
(2) if she is married and does not want any more children? (3) if the womans own
health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy? (4)if the family has a very low income
and cannot a¤ord any more children? (5) if she became pregnant as a result of rape?
(6) if she is not married and does not want to marry the man? (7) if the woman wants
it for any reason?
There is an obvious di¤erence between the NES question and the GSS question.
While in the NES case we have respondentsanswers to one question, which is logi-
cally dened to progress from less inclusive to more inclusive denitions of permissible
abortion, the GSS survey gives us the yes-no responses to seven di¤erent questions,
without making it evident how to combine them into a single scale. One possibility
is to follow conventional practice in the public opinion literature and build a 0-7 scale
which captures the number of times that respondents answered each of these questions
in the a¢ rmative. We discuss alternative approaches below.
Our interest is in understanding how these preference indicators correlate with
enacted abortion legislation across time in the 50 United States and the District of
Columbia. We construct our indicators of the distribution of preferences over abor-
tion policies for each state-year using conditional and unconditional moments and per-
centiles of the empirical distribution of preferences. Given each respondentsanswer
to the NES and GSS questions, we calculate the median preference over abortion re-
strictions (mi ), the median preference of voters who self-identify as republicans (tri )
and of those who self-identify as democrats (tdi ). We also construct several indicators
of the distribution of preferences over abortion legislation 1:::n, including the mean,
standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of this distribution as well as the average
preference conditional diverse individual characteristics. We calculate 378 state-year
observations based on 18409 individual-level survey responses for the NES data and
575 state-year observations based on 18976 individual-level survey responses for the
GSS data.
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The use of these measures to proxy for the distribution of preferences within states
at any given year may raise questions about reliability. The NES and GSS samples
are designed to be representative at a national level and not at the state level. Among
other things, this means that survey weights are calculated so as to replicate national,
not state-level population characteristics. It is not atypical for very small states like
Rhode Island or Delaware to have as few as two observations in given years whereas
large states like California and New York commonly have around 200 observations per
year. The signal-to-noise ratio for small states is likely to be low, and may generate
substantial attenuation bias.
Commonly, the optimal (and often unavailable) solution to ascertain the reliability
of a given survey-based measure is to correlate it with a measure obtained from another
survey. While this solution is commonly unavailable at the individual level (as it
would require independent surveying of the same individuals), it is available to us at
the state-year level since we can compare state-year survey responses to the GSS and
NES questions. This method also allows us to gauge the e¤ect of di¤erent question
wordings and sampling decisions on our summary state-level indicators. If these survey
characteristics had a signicant e¤ect on our indicators, we would expect the correlation
between the GSS and NES data to be low, while if they are not very relevant we would
expect to derive a high correlation.
The upper panel of Table 1 shows the correlations between di¤erent characteristics
of the state-level preference distribution for the GSS and NES data. The correlation
between the mean abortion preferences of the two indicators is .413. This low correla-
tion indicates that there appears to be considerable measurement error for our complete
sample. This problem is exacerbated as one goes to the higher moments of the distri-
bution, which typically require more observations to attain a given level of condence.
However, Table 1 also shows that a considerable part of this low correlation can be
attributed to the e¤ect of states with a small number of observations. As we drop the
states with less than a minimum threshold of observations, the correlations improve sig-
nicantly: when the lower threshold is 50 observations, our correlation between means
from the GSS and NES indicators increases to .649, while if it is 100 observations, the
correlation increases to .797. These calculations suggest that a substantial fraction of
the measurement error in this variable comes from the e¤ect of very small states. The
lower panel of Table 1 also puts this problem in perspective by calculating the average
widths of 95% condence intervals that could be built around each state-level estimator
of a distributional characteristic. In order to interpret these numbers, note that both
the GSS and NES indices are scaled between 0 and 1. The average half-width of a
condence interval for the mean abortion preference in the whole NES sample is +/-
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0.097, whereas that for the sample restricted to n  50 would be +/-.058. While the
width of these intervals is far from negligible, it does suggest that the data has the
ability to distinguish between conservative, moderate and liberal states.
[Insert Table 1 here]
As an indicator of enacted policy, we will use variations in abortion legislation
across states. In its hallmark 1972 Roe v. Wade decision, the Supreme Court left open
substantial leeway for states to regulate abortion during the second two trimesters of
pregnancy. While overturning existing abortion bans, the Supreme Court argued that
after the rst trimester of pregnancy, states could regulate abortion in ways which are
reasonably related to maternal health with the purpose of protecting the health of the
mother, while in the third trimester it could regulate and even prohibit abortion, except
when it was necessary to protect the health of the mother. In 1992, Casey v. Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania opened the door for legislation which did not
impose an "undue burden " on pregnant women seeking abortions, such as informed
consent laws. A number of states also passed partial birth abortion bans until these
were struck down by the 2000 Stenberg v. Carhart decision.6 These decisions generated
broad variations in abortion legislation across states. Our dependent variable will
consist of four indicators of the restrictiveness of abortion legislation at the state level:
(i) whether the state had a parental involvement law requiring notication or consent
of parents for performing the abortion procedure (ii) whether the state had an informed
consent law requiring abortion providers to inform pregnant women about potential
health risks, the development of their unborn children, and resources available to them
in case they decided not to perform the procedure (iii) whether the state adopted a
partial birth abortion ban, restricting the use of the Intact Dilation and Extraction
abortion procedure that is commonly only used during late-second trimester or early
third trimester pregnancies, and (iv) whether the state restricts the use of Medicaid
funds to fund therapeutic abortions.7
We experiment with two di¤erent ways in which to combine these four di¤erent
indicators of abortion legislation into an outcome variable. The simplest approach
is to generate an indicator of the number of abortion restrictions (out of these four)
that the state imposed on abortion in a given year. The resulting indicator is a
0-4 count variable for which we will adopt a xed e¤ects Poisson specication. In
6In November, 2003, President Bush signed a National Partial Birth Abortion Ban. This statute
was declared unconstitutional by federal judges in several states. However, on April 18, 2007, the US
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the ban.
7This data was originally collected by New (2004).
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order to control for correlation between our explanatory variables and unobserved state
characteristics, we include state-level e¤ects in each specication. Such an indicator,
however, would assume that voters view each of these four possible restrictions as
equivalent. Since this assumption may no be very appealing, we construct an additional
indicator which measures the estimated reduction in abortions that can be attributed
to each states combination of abortion policies. This indicator would be a valid
measure of policies if we assume that voters do not care about the restrictions per
se but rather about the reduction in abortions that they may generate. Michael
New (2004) has estimated the e¤ect of these four pieces of abortion legislation on
the abortion rate, and found that all four have the expected negative coe¢ cients,
with informed consent laws and Medicaid funding restrictions having a consistently
signicant negative e¤ect, while partial birth and parental involvement laws have a
negative yet not always signicant e¤ect. We use the expected reduction in the CDC
abortion rate generated by each states combination of abortion legislation measures
as an indicator of the restrictiveness of abortion legislation. Since this variable is
censored at zero, we use panel Tobit regressions to study its relation with abortion
preferences. In contrast to the Poisson case, there is no consistent estimator for a xed
e¤ects Tobit model due to the incidental parameters problem. We therefore report a
random e¤ects estimator as our baseline for this model.
4.2 The unique equilibrium case
4.2.1 Baseline Panel Regressions
Table 2 presents the results of baseline regressions with the NES indicator. The rst
set of columns report the panel Poisson specications that use the number of abortion
restrictions as a dependent variable, while the second set reports the Tobit speci-
cations that use the predicted reduction in CDC abortion rate generated by these
restrictions as the left-hand side variable. For each methodology, four di¤erent spec-
ications are reported: a baseline specication that controls for the moments of the
preference distribution, a second one that adds a control for the possibility that more
educated voters have a greater impact on policies, a third one that adds controls for a
set of environmental variables that may a¤ect the willingness of governments to adopt
abortion restrictions, and a last specication dropping the preference distribution con-
trols.8 The results do not support the prediction that emerges from the commitment
8Additional specications (not reported) included controls for the preferences of voters with a
higher level of income and those of di¤erent races. The results are broadly similar to those of the
reported specications.
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model of a positively sloped relationship between the preferences of constituents and
enacted policies. Indeed, of the sixteen coe¢ cients on constituent preferences reported
in these tables, all of the point estimates are negative, with 8 of them attaining sta-
tistical signicance at 5% and a further 3 at 10%. The median population preference
has a positive sign, as indicated by theory, although it is only signicant at 10% in 3
of the 8 specications.
[Insert Table 2 here]
As we have discussed above, there may be considerable measurement error arising
from the fact that some of our state-level indicators are constructed with a small number
of observations. Table 3 addresses this issue by repeating the same set of regressions as
in Table 2, but now limited to state-years with at least 50 observations. This restricts
the sample considerably, to 137 observations in 27 states. Most of the coe¢ cient
estimates increase their magnitude signicantly, as would be expected if measurement
error were generating attenuation bias. Again, 8 of the 16 coe¢ cient estimates are
signicantly negative at 5%, though in this subsample 7 of them pertain to the e¤ect
of changes in the preferences of democrat constituents. The median voterspreference
still enters with a positive sign, which is signicant at 10% or less in all 8 specications.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Table 4 studies the results of running the same regressions using the GSS-based
preference variables as our right-hand side variable. Table 4 uses the sum of responses
to the seven GSS questions as an indicator of aversion to abortion and restricts to
the number of individual responses in a state to be greater than 50. A principal
components index as well as regressions on the full sample (not reported) delivered
similar results. In the case of the GSS, we again nd no evidence for the commitment
model, with all of the 16 coe¢ cient estimates on party constituent preferences being
negative, 3 of them signicant at 5% and another 3 at 10%. There is again a signicant
di¤erence in patterns observed between the results for democrats, which have ve of the
six signicant coe¢ cients, and those of republicans. Note that while this implies that
the evidence that parties are in a suboptimal region of the expected policy function
is stronger for democrats than for republicans, it does not imply that democrats are
farther than republicans from the median voter, since there is no simple relationship
between distance from the median and the slope of the expected policy function. What
the results do say is that there is strong evidence that democrats could improve their
electoral perspectives if they became more moderate on the abortion issue.9
9We also experimented with alternative combinations of the subcomponents of the GSS indicator
that may be indicative of di¤erent dimensions of respondentspreferences over abortion legislation.
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[Insert Table 4 here]
To this moment, we have used a random e¤ects Tobit specication when our depen-
dent variable is predicted abortion. Some authors have suggested that the incidental
parameters problem does not produce major inconsistencies when the number of time
periods T is reasonably high. Heckman and MaCurdy(1980) have argued that with
T = 8 the inconsistency is minor, whereas Greene (2004) provides Monte Carlo evi-
dence that the Tobit model is largely una¤ected by the incidental parameters problem.
In Table 5 we report results of the xed e¤ects Tobit estimator. The table shows re-
sults for the whole sample, where the average value of T is 7:53, close to the Heckman
and MaCurdy threshold (in the restricted sample T = 5:84). The results again reveal
a consistent negative pattern of the coe¢ cients: all of the point estimates for the
partisan preferences are negative, three of them signicantly so.10
4.2.2 Endogeneity
We now turn to the issue of misspecication bias arising from the possible endogeneity
of our right-hand side variables. As our right-hand side variables pertain to indicators
of the distribution of preferences across state residents, any argument of endogeneity
would have to start out from the assumption that policies can either a¤ect preferences
or be a¤ected by a third variable that also determines preferences. One reason why this
may be the case may have to do with the role of "leadership" in galvanizing support
for or against policies. The adoption of policies may make it easier to mobilize support
against them, particularly among politically mobilized individuals that may become
inamed when certain policies are adopted. This phenomenon could account for a
negative relationship between policies and the preferences of party members.
Our proposed instruments are taken from the literature on the determination of
abortion preferences (Jelen and Wilcox, 2003) and refer to variables that are unlikely
to be a¤ected by adopted policies and that nevertheless have been found to have
a signicant e¤ect on abortion preferences. In particular, we choose indicators of
church attendance, religious orientation, gender, race, and age of the average republican
In particular, a principal components analysis of individual-level responses to these ve questions
uncovered two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, with the rst component clearly inuenced
by responses to "imposed needs " cases which reect situations which are out of the control of the
mother, such as rape and incest, while the second component was associated with "preference based"
decisions such as aborting because of a desire to have no more children or not wanting to marry.The
results obtained using these two indicators as dependent variables - available from the authors upon
request -are broadly similar, with the negative coe¢ cient on democratspreferences becoming much
stronger when the imposed needs indicator is used as a dependent variable.
10Results for the restricted sample, available from the authors upon request, are very similar: all
point estimates on partisan preferences are also negative, three of them signicantly.
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and democrat constituents as our instruments.11 The key identication assumption
should be understood as the assumption that if the average church attendance (religious
orientation/age/gender/race composition) of republicans increases, holding xed the
preferences over abortion of the population as a whole, then the only e¤ect that this
will have on equilibrium policies will operate through the changes that it will e¤ect on
the preferences of republicans over abortion. Table 5 shows the results of applying the
Rivers-Vuong (1988) auxiliary regression endogeneity tests with these instruments on
our specication on the NES restricted sample. These tests use the residuals from a
rst stage regression to test for endogeneity in the second stage regression: under the
hypothesis of exogeneity, the coe¢ cient on this residual should be zero.12 We report
two specications, one with controls for environmental variables in the second stage
regression, and another one without them. As shown in Table 6, the rst stage F-tests
are all signicant at 1%. None of the six endogeneity tests, in contrast, are signicant
at conventional levels. The tests thus provide little evidence for feedback from policies
to constituent preferences.13
[Insert Table 5 here]
In the presence of endogeneity, the second stage regression yields consistent esti-
mates of the e¤ects of the endogenous variable. These will of course be ine¢ cient if
endogeneity is not present, as the results of Table 6 suggest. Nevertheless, it is inter-
esting to note that the second stage results, reported in Table 7, are broadly similar
to those of our previous estimation exercises: all 12 point estimates are negative, with
ve of them signicant at 5%. The IV estimation thus also fails to provide evidence in
favor of the commitment model.
[Insert Table 6 here]
[Insert Table 7 here]
11Concretely, we construct seven instruments for each party measuring the percentage of party
members who are white, male, catholic, older than 61, attend church every week, almost every week
or once or twice a month.
12This is an extension of the Hausmann (1978) auxiliary regression test. Smith and Blundell (1986)
develop the Tobit case while Vella and Verbeek (1999) and Arendt (2001) deal with the extension to
panel data.
13A comparable exercise on the GSS sample delivered very similar results: exogeneity could not be
rejected in 11 of the 12 equations estimated. However, a key di¤erence is that the rst stage tests
indicated very weak instruments in the GSS sample, making the results less reliable.
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4.3 The multiple equilibria case
In our theoretical section we have highlighted the potential for multiple equilibria in
the commitment model. This is a general feature of many political economy models.
For the empirical work done in the previous subsection to be correct one has to im-
plicitly assume that the data is generated by a political economy model with a unique
equilibrium. In this sub-section we perform tests of our comparative statics results that
are robust to the presence of multiple equilibria in the underlying political economy
model.
Our empirical strategy will be based on a xed e¤ects quantile estimator (see
Koenker, 2004). Technically, the estimator requires solving:
min
;
nX
=1
mX
i=1
(i   i()  0i())) (8)
where  refers to the quantile of interest, i() denotes a state and quantile-specic
xed e¤ect, and  = [tli ; tli ; ; mi ; 1i ; :::; ni ; :::] is a vector of control variables
14. A
well-known problem in implementing (8) for discrete dependent variables is that when-
ever there are points of positive mass, the nonsmoothness of the objective function
is not averaged out in the optimization, making it di¢ cult to obtain the asymptotic
distribution of conditional quantiles thorugh conventional methods. Machado and San-
tos Silva (2005) propose a smoothing methodology for count variables that consists in
adding a uniformly distributed random variable to the dependent variable and averag-
ing out the resulting estimates from a large number of replications, a method which
they call "average-jittering".15 A monotone transformation of the articial variable
can be used in quantile regression estimators such as (8). Since this method has not
been developed for censored regression models, we will only present estimates for the
number of abortion restrictions as the dependent variable.16
Table 8 displays the results of our estimates of (8) using the average-jittered trans-
14See our discussion of the incidental parameers problem in section 4:2:1, which apply similarly to
this case. Note also that in (8) the xed e¤ect vi() varies with the quantile being estimated. Koenker
(2004) suggests that there is an e¢ ciency gain from assuming a single xed e¤ect across quantiles
and jointly estimating all quantiles. Such a characterization is inadequate when the quantiles are
generated by models of multiple equilibria. This is because multiple equilibria exist when there
are two values of the dependent variable corresponding to the same values of all fundamentals. The
di¤erences between equilibria will thus show up as quantile-specic unobserved heterogeneity.
15This method is implemented using the Stata QCOUNT routine of Miranda (2006).
16Our predicted abortion variable also has points of positive mass corresponding to the nite com-
binations of abortion restrictions that generate the prediction. Therefore standard censored quantil
regression methods for continuous variables (e.g., Powell(1986)) cannot be applied. Estimation of
censored quantile regressions with multiple positive mass points has - to the best of our knowledge -
not been adressed in the econometrics literature.
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form for  = f:1; :25; :75; :9g. We again display results for a specication with controls
and, in orded to reduce the inconsistency coming from the incidental parameters prob-
lem, use the complete sample17. The results are again inconsistent with the commit-
ment hypothesis. For the NES data, all coe¢ cients on partisan preferences are again
negative, with ve of them signicantly so. For the GSS data, six of the eight coe¢ -
cients are negative, with three of them signicant. It does not appear that the failure
of the commitment model in explaining the data can be attributed to misspecication
coming from the existence of multiple equilibria.
[Insert Table 8 here]
5 Concluding Comments
We have argued that the cross-state abortion legislation data displays a pattern that
is inconsistent with the existence of mechanisms that allow parties to make binding
policy promises. Parties with the ability to precommit will never be on the downward
sloping portion of the expected policy function, in which a moderation of their policy
promise would move expected policies in their direction. Placing yourself in such a
situation would be inconsistent with optimizing behavior, as utility could be easily
increased by moderating, thus moving expected policies in your direction, while at the
same time generating a safer lottery among policy alternatives. Politicians that lack
the ability to credibly commit to keeping their promises, in contrast, may well nd
themselves on this downward sloping segment. Estimating the shape of the expected
policy function that links enacted policies with the policy preferences of parties gives
us a way to empirically evaluate the relevance of the credibility problem in politics.
In this paper, we have provided such a test using data on abortion legislation
and preferences for a panel of US states. We nd that the expected policy function
appears on average to be negatively sloped. Almost all of the estimates of this slope
presented in this paper were negative, with nearly half signicantly so. This evidence
is inconsistent with the hypothesis that politicians are able to make credible policy
commitments.
Why this function is pervasively negatively sloped is an interesting fact in itself.
The credibility model does not predict that this function must be negatively sloped:
it only shows that it can have this slope. Recall from section 2 that the negative
slope of the expected policy function corresponds to the cases in which politicians
17See our discussion of the incidental parameters problem for the Tobit xed e¤ects model in section
4.2.1.
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preferences are too extreme for voters. If parties happen to be moderate, they will
fall in the same range of the expected policy function in which credible politicians
are able to position themselves. The fact that our coe¢ cient estimates are generally
negative is indicative that in equilibrium, extreme politicians not only exist but are
pervasive. To understand why this is the case, one would wish to be able to study
the interaction between the shape of this policy function and the process of candidate
selection. Regrettably, existing models that study the entry decision together with
the existence of credibility problems (Besley and Coate, 1997, Osborne and Sivlinsky,
1996) have only dealt with the case of certainty and therefore produce degenerate policy
functions which are not easily amenable to empirical analysis. Further elaboration of
these interactions is a promising area of future research.
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Correlates 0 10 30 50 80 100
Correlations between GSS and NES state-
year indicators
Mean 0.413 0.470 0.554 0.649 0.7575 0.797
Standard Deviation 0.050 0.029 0.066 0.192 0.3895 0.6166
Skewness 0.400 0.457 0.536 0.671 0.734 0.7434
Kurtosis 0.078 0.016 0.115 0.568 0.6878 0.7266
Widths of confidence interval 
National Election Studies
Mean +/-0.097 +/-0.082 +/-0.069 +/-0.058 +/-0.049 +/-0.044
Standard Deviation +/-0.062 +/-0.058 +/-0.049 +/-0.041 +/-0.035 +/-0.031
Skewness +/-0.948 +/-0.756 +/-0.640 +/-0.533 +/-0.447 +/-0.402
Kurtosis +/-1.897 +/-1.512 +/-1.281 +/-1.067 +/-0.894 +/-0.805
General Social Survey
Mean +/-0.106 +/-0.088 +/-0.070 +/-0.060 +/-0.050 +/-0.046
Standard Deviation +/-0.057 +/-0.048 +/-0.034 +/-0.029 +/-0.023 +/-0.020
Skewness +/-1.063 +/-0.909 +/-0.659 +/-0.557 +/-0.465 +/-0.420
Kurtosis +/-2.126 +/-1.818 +/-1.319 +/-1.115 +/-0.931 +/-0.840
Minimum number of observations per state-year
Table 1: Measures of Reliability
Note: Both the NES and GSS indicators are normalized to lie in the 0-1 range  
 
35
Specification 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable Number of legislative restrictions (0-4) Abortion-reducing effect of legal restrictions
0.3199 0.3123 0.3104 0.3066 0.8075 0.835 0.8594 0.7554
(0.2198)      (0.2158)      (0.2100)      (0.1622)* (0.4723)* (0.4652)* (0.6384)      (0.4233)*
Median republicans -0.3212 -0.317 -0.3592 -0.3351 -0.5459 -0.5098 -0.5771 -0.5526
(0.1065)*** (0.1076)*** (0.0869)*** (0.0696)*** (0.2529)** (0.3261)      (0.2964)* (0.1896)***
Median democrats -0.2483 -0.2663 -0.2292 -0.2169 -0.3949 -0.4098 -0.4399 -0.4414
(0.1202)** (0.1219)** (0.1375)* (0.1302)* (0.2889)      (0.2953)      (0.2840)      (0.2629)*
Mean 1.4302 1.7134 1.2545 0.9671 1.2034 1.2036
(1.0327)      (1.0900)      (1.0591)      (1.7544)      (2.1975)      (1.8508)      
Standard Deviation 0.3351 0.516 0.0971 -2.8223 -2.8929 -2.2794
(1.2447)      (1.2060)      (1.2112)      (2.2491)      (2.1377)      (2.8108)      
Skewness 0.2323 0.2457 0.2205 0.277 0.269 0.2952
(0.1829)      (0.1770)      (0.1499)      (0.2638)      (0.2719)      (0.1872)      
Kurtosis 0.0664 0.0678 0.0332 0.148 0.1537 0.1236
(0.0728)      (0.0793)      (0.0704)      (0.1932)      (0.1778)      (0.1404)      
Interquartile -0.196 -0.1814 -0.2057 0.3545 0.4146 0.1261
(0.1749)      (0.1832)      (0.1887)      (0.5075)      (0.4755)      (0.5372)      
Median College 
Educated -0.0943 -0.3236
(0.1024)      (0.2713)      
Proportion of 
females 15-44 -11.2928 -12.0009 4.8817 4.0167
(6.7412)* (4.7732)** (7.9792)      (9.9959)      
Log of Per Capita 
Real Gross State 
Product 0.3406 0.3152 1.13 1.0978
(0.3985)      (0.3759)      (1.5256)      (1.6120)      
Log of 
Intergovernmental 
Aid 0.2399 0.2498 0.5805 0.6496
(0.2099)      (0.1966)      (0.5047)      (0.5180)      
Constant -1.5485 -1.4983 -18.8099 -17.9535
(1.6227)      (1.9634)      (18.1237)    (16.0039)    
N. Observations 320 318 320 320 323 321 323 324
N. Groups 39 39 39 39 42 42 42 43
Table 2: Complete Sample Regressions, National Election Studies
Note: All regressions include period dummies. Bootstrapped panel-consistent standard errors, generated with 50 replications, in 
parentheses.*,** and *** indicate significance tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Tobit Random EffectsPoisson Fixed Effects
Median
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Specification 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable Number of legislative restrictions (0-4) Abortion-reducing effect of legal restrictions
0.8049 0.8023 0.8583 0.9127 1.3285 1.336 1.3172 1.5904
(0.3390)** (0.3029)*** (0.3208)*** (0.2394)*** (0.7652)* (0.7378)* (0.7179)* (0.6655)**
Median republicans -0.3195 -0.3271 -0.3664 -0.3273 -0.8856 -0.9054 -0.7178 -0.4884
(0.2100)      (0.2293)      (0.2245)      (0.1467)** (0.6541)      (0.7878)      (0.7924)      (0.5116)      
Median democrats -0.5619 -0.5747 -0.5867 -0.5278 -1.178 -1.1966 -1.173 -1.0541
(0.1833)*** (0.2032)*** (0.2045)*** (0.1272)*** (0.5193)** (0.7278)      (0.5205)** (0.4143)**
Mean -0.746 -0.5672 -0.7902 6.0839 5.445 2.3378
(2.5201)      (3.0089)      (2.4516)      (8.9287)      (10.7917)    (9.5477)      
Standard Deviation -3.3328 -3.1679 -2.4955 0.8278 0.0252 -0.9592
(2.8361)      (2.7199)      (3.3641)      (9.7265)      (12.5608)    (12.1030)    
Skewness -0.2003 -0.1887 -0.2454 0.6483 0.587 0.1096
(0.4252)      (0.4560)      (0.4143)      (1.7061)      (1.9094)      (1.6645)      
Kurtosis -0.0685 -0.0609 -0.0899 0.4221 0.3181 0.1656
(0.2073)      (0.1926)      (0.2518)      (0.8319)      (0.9655)      (0.7930)      
Interquartile 0.1153 0.1286 0.0748 0.4381 0.4315 0.4136
(0.2780)      (0.2990)      (0.2549)      (0.6709)      (0.9140)      (0.7115)      
Median College 
Educated -0.0508 -0.0004
(0.1250)      (0.4635)      
Proportion of 
females 15-44 15.5011 15.7888 28.0969 29.4186
(14.0795)    (12.3313)    (14.1907)** (15.4681)*
Log of Per Capita 
Real Gross State 
Product -0.2316 -0.299 1.6051 1.3435
(1.0576)      (0.7534)      (2.4467)      (2.0640)      
Log of 
Intergovernmental 
Aid 0.6676 0.6921 0.5783 0.4689
(0.2616)** (0.1946)*** (1.0181)      (0.9717)      
Constant -5.5307 -4.6914 -34.934 -30.8155
(9.3009)      (11.3919)    (28.4712)    (21.2148)    
N. Observations 132 132 132 132 137 137 137 137
N. Groups 22 22 22 22 27 27 27 27
Table 3: Restricted Sample Regressions, National Election Studies
Note:All regressions include period dummies. Bootstrapped panel-consistent standard errors, generated with 50 replications, in 
parentheses.*,** and *** indicate significance tests at  10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Tobit Random EffectsPoisson Fixed Effects
Median
 
37
Specification 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable Number of legislative restrictions (0-4) Abortion-reducing effect of legal restrictions
0.802 0.6493 1.2497 1.5719 2.7945 2.695 4.971 7.3108
(0.8400)      (0.9337)      (1.0940)      (0.7048)** (2.0184)      (2.3298)      (2.8503)* (2.1679)***
Median republicans -0.4392 -0.4172 -0.6391 -0.603 -0.7151 -0.8322 -1.3441 -0.9224
(0.3628)      (0.4153)      (0.3553)* (0.4387)      (1.7809)      (1.7320)      (1.6696)      (1.6943)      
Median democrats -1.2455 -1.2206 -0.9301 -0.8208 -4.8916 -4.7841 -5.7254 -4.3994
(0.6769)* (0.8857)      (0.5429)* (0.5278)      (2.2400)** (2.9494)      (2.5813)** (2.1139)**
Mean 5.1454 5.837 3.3452 16.2544 18.0725 11.8962
(3.3147)      (3.4771)* (2.9803)      (10.6553)    (12.1966)    (12.1803)    
Standard Deviation 4.1555 4.3337 3.2403 20.8947 21.2193 10.8392
(5.3244)      (6.0000)      (5.0570)      (23.2541)    (26.6502)    (24.9726)    
Skewness 0.3713 0.3387 0.2689 0.3757 0.1935 -0.1889
(0.3682)      (0.4387)      (0.3119)      (1.9337)      (2.0348)      (1.9981)      
Kurtosis 0.0546 0.0455 0.0354 -0.1834 -0.2234 -0.2323
(0.0710)      (0.0764)      (0.0512)      (0.3735)      (0.3692)      (0.3922)      
Interquartile -0.5497 -0.4899 -0.4753 -1.5496 -0.8974 2.3379
(1.2967)      (1.4736)      (1.2955)      (7.3372)      (7.4742)      (5.6702)      
Median College 
Educated -0.3771 -1.7728
(0.3909)      (0.9137)*
Proportion of 
females 15-44 15.4598 17.4856 1.5071 -2.1072
(16.6954)    (14.8631)    (14.6901)    (19.2285)    
Log of Per Capita 
Real Gross State 
Product -1.3521 -1.4875 2.542 2.8792
(1.1847)      (1.1534)      (3.2870)      (3.4932)      
Log of 
Intergovernmental 
Aid 0.9092 0.9202 3.687 3.6263
(0.5063)* (0.4416)** (1.1110)*** (1.4788)**
Constant -9.8648 -10.0454 -57.1658 -50.4191
(12.4352)    (13.0502)    (33.6433)* (34.1080)    
N. Observations 108 108 108 108 111 111 111 111
N. Groups 16 16 16 16 19 19 19 19
Table 4: Restricted Sample Regressions, General Social Survey
Note: All regressions include period dummies. Bootstrapped panel-consistent standard errors, generated with 50 replications, in 
parentheses.*,** and *** indicate significance tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Tobit Random EffectsPoisson Fixed Effects
Median
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Specification 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable Number of legislative restrictions (0-4) Abortion-reducing effect of legal restrictions
0.6572 0.5086 0.3082 0.6456 0.3535 0.9049 0.5493 0.3698
(0.5397)      (0.6843)      (0.7212)      (0.4035)      (0.5755)      (0.6244)      (0.5158)      (0.4812)      
Median republicans -0.0275 -0.0842 -0.2268 -0.1933 -0.5169 -0.5147 -0.3488 -0.3695
(0.3788)      (0.3111)      (0.3283)      (0.3285)      (0.3307)      (0.3198)      (0.2646)      (0.2412)      
Median democrats -0.4306 -0.4544 -0.4866 -0.4413 -1.0509 -0.6107 -0.5105 -0.5388
(0.3588)      (0.4232)      (0.3166)      (0.2901)      (0.4698)** (0.3727)      (0.2817)* (0.3155)*
Mean 0.6462 1.7194 0.9992 1.6454 -0.547 0.7897
(1.2186)      (1.3183)      (1.1435)      (2.9091)      (2.7160)      (2.1061)      
Standard Deviation 1.0367 1.2474 1.0765 -1.1412 -6.1056 -2.0589
(1.0693)      (1.4415)      (1.1357)      (3.4681)      (3.3282)* (2.8366)      
Skewness 0.0247 -0.0359 0.0094 0.1947 -0.0512 0.2782
(0.1046)      (0.1295)      (0.0900)      (0.3454)      (0.4612)      (0.2966)      
Kurtosis -0.0208 -0.0411 -0.0177 0.1567 0.0252 0.1731
(0.0360)      (0.0377)      (0.0394)      (0.2404)      (0.2977)      (0.1790)      
Interquartile -0.2762 -0.3315 -0.492 -0.0436 0.7467 0.0417
(0.5771)      (0.6377)      (0.5268)      (0.5786)      (0.8162)      (0.5267)      
Median College 
Educated -0.6621 -0.2167
(0.2661)** (0.3952)      
Proportion of 
females 15-44 20.5002 20.7025 25.7682 24.2067
(8.4514)** (7.8349)*** (7.6017)*** (8.1492)***
Log of Per Capita 
Real Gross State 
Product -1.8494 -1.8194 -0.4776 -0.7257
(0.8943)** (0.9307)* (1.0338)      (0.8882)      
Log of 
Intergovernmental 
Aid -0.1084 -0.088 0.1361 0.1686
(0.4381)      (0.5432)      (0.3613)      (0.3406)      
N. Observations 503 468 501 501 323 220 323 324
N. Groups 50 44 44 44 42 35 42 43
Table 5: Fixed Effects Tobit Estimators, Complete Sample
Note: All regressions include period dummies. Bootstrapped panel-consistent standard errors, generated with 50 replications, in 
parentheses.*,** and *** indicate significance tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Tobit Random EffectsPoisson Fixed Effects
Median
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Table 6: Auxiliary Regression Endogeneity Test, National Election Studies
Specification Without controls With controls
Democrats 0.0006 0.0008
Republicans 0.0083 0.0069
Poisson 0.5500 0.3330
Tobit 0.3240 0.7400
Poisson 0.1000 0.2850
Tobit 0.3310 0.1580
Poisson 0.1228 0.2990
Tobit 0.5876 0.2130
Note: First stage estimated by maximum likelihood.  P-values correspond to Wald tests based on bootstrapped panel-
consistent standard errors, generated with 50 replications.
Joint
Endogeneity test
First Stage Instruments 
Significance
Democrats
Republicans
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Table 7: Second Stage Estimates, National Election Studies
Endogeneity Control Specification Democrat Median Republican Median
Poisson -0.8976 -0.4070
(0.6485) (0.328)
Tobit -3.5390 -1.4080
(2.1454)* (1.0515)
Poisson -0.8267 -0.9856
(0.1897)*** (0.4007)**
Tobit -1.7193 -2.5624
(0.706)** (1.6606)
Poisson -1.2234 -1.1081
(0.5074)** (0.4284)**
Tobit -3.5933 -1.6423
(2.5076) (1.8375)
Democrats
Republicans
Joint
Note: Bootstrapped panel-consistent standard errors, generated with 50 replications, in parentheses.*,** and 
*** indicate significance tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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 Specification (1)                (2)                (3)                (4)              (5)                (6)                (7)                (8)                
Percentile 10 25 75 90 10 25 75 90
0.2682 0.2868 0.1549 0.0948 0.1535 0.1292 -0.0226 -0.0547
(0.1502)* (0.194)         (0.160)         (0.126)       (0.0791)* (0.0490)*** (0.114)         (0.088)         
-0.258 -0.2971 -0.3015 -0.1908 -0.0431 -0.0275 0.0489 0.043
(0.0546)*** (0.0878)*** (0.1310)** (0.0881)** (0.044)         (0.031)         (0.054)         (0.030)         
-0.0824 -0.2182 -0.1885 -0.1626 -0.1929 -0.1502 -0.1308 -0.063
(0.058)         (0.0965)** (0.160)         (0.113)       (0.0381)*** (0.0318)*** (0.0230)*** (0.042)         
0.3839 1.5011 0.657 0.3355 0.425 0.5316 0.5173 0.2701
(0.425)         (0.3163)*** (0.822)         (1.809)       (0.1448)*** (0.1063)*** (0.0812)*** (0.0807)***
0.0883 0.6204 -0.1227 -0.0704 1.1127 1.0158 0.6814 0.4646
(0.437)         (0.568)         (0.681)         (1.615)       (0.2160)*** (0.2231)*** (0.1187)*** (0.0912)***
0.1041 0.2868 0.0936 0.0353 0.0231 0.0299 0.0173 -0.0003
(0.0527)** (0.0776)*** (0.0562)* (0.388)       (0.0079)*** (0.0112)*** (0.012)         (0.010)         
0.0136 0.0444 0.0089 -0.0159 -0.0102 -0.0011 -0.0026 -0.0094
(0.041)         (0.0199)** (0.072)         (0.183)       (0.0049)** (0.005)         (0.005)         (0.0044)**
-0.2315 -0.2693 -0.1836 -0.2565 -0.4538 -0.2916 -0.135 -0.1535
(0.173)         (0.0534)*** (0.144)         (0.1278)** (0.0906)*** (0.0851)*** (0.0759)* (0.0660)**
-6.7694 -14.5054 -10.8161 -8.9462 5.5042 0.5202 1.4808 1.9492
(1.1913)*** (4.0061)*** (3.6706)*** (5.612)       (1.1054)*** (2.293)         (1.462)         (1.1644)*
0.4051 0.4988 0.6505 0.4385 -0.359 -0.2649 -0.2554 -0.2593
(0.1485)*** (0.1135)*** (0.3452)* (0.530)       (0.0511)*** (0.1145)** (0.1111)** (0.1117)**
0.3356 0.335 0.1993 0.1913 -0.1539 -0.2183 -0.1542 -0.0867
(0.0590)*** (0.1035)*** (0.213)         (0.200)       (0.0669)** (0.0690)*** (0.0387)*** (0.0328)***
N. Observations 323 323 323 323 501 501 501 501
N. Groups 42               42               42             42            44             44             44               44              
Interquartile
Median
Median republicans
Median democrats
Mean
General Social Survey
Table 8: Quantile Regressions for Number of Legislative Restrictions, Complete Sample
Estimation uses the average-jittering method of Machado and Santos Silva (2005).  Bootstrapped panel-consistent standard 
errors in parenthesis.  Each estimation uses 10 replications for each jittered estimate and 100 bootstrap replications, for a total of 
1000 independent draws. All regressions include time and state-specific effects.
Proportion of 
females 15-44
Log of Per Capita 
Real Gross State 
Product
Log of 
Intergovernmental 
Aid
National Election Studies
Standard Deviation
Skewness
Kurtosis
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